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Israel’s nuclear policy troubles law, but does not 
violate it. The World Court (International Court of 
Justice/ICJ) delivered its 1996 Advisory Opinion 
on the use of nuclear weapons without mentioning 
Israel. But the Jewish state sat beyond the bar as 
the elephant in the courtroom. Numerous United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on nuclear weapons had 
preceded the one that requested this Court’s advisory opinion — some of 
those resolutions had singled out Israel for criticism of its nuclear program. 
The linkage to this case was clear. By finding the use of nuclear weapons 
generally illegal, the Court pleased the anti-Israel General Assembly 
majority. By failing to find an absolute prohibition on use and failing to 
find any prohibition on possession, the Court undoubtedly disappointed 
that majority.
The world community creates international law by two principal 
means. First, if two or more states agree to a course of action or a set of 
rules — for example, to charge no more than specified tariffs on each other’s 
imports — that treaty binds them legally. The agreement does not bind other 
states that are not parties to it. Second, if the overwhelming majority of 
states follow a particular practice among themselves — for example, not 
arresting one another’s diplomats — and if they believe that practice to be 
required, such a custom is an international law.
No world parliament exists. No global body can legislate. Thus, the 
UNGA does not make laws. It passes “resolutions” that do not have binding 
effect (understandable for a body where a mini-state like Lichtenstein or 
the Bahamas has the same one vote as mammoth countries like India and 
China). Neither does the UN Security Council (UNSC) create generally 
applicable law. It does issue binding legal orders applicable to specific state 
parties who, it finds, threaten international peace and security in particular
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situations. Such resolutions are not general international laws — they are 
only orders to the parties involved.
The UN Charter (UNC) provides the most powerful collection of 
rules of international law from any single source. Virtually all states have 
ratified this treaty and, therefore, the entire world is legally bound by its 
provisions. No other international agreement comes close to its substantive 
scope of coverage and its universality of acceptance. The Charter establishes 
the ICJ as the judicial arm of the UN. That court may settle legal questions 
brought before it by contending state parties, thus promoting one of the UN’s 
principal aims — the peaceful settlement of disputes and the avoidance of 
armed conflict. The ICJ possesses a secondary judicial power — to render 
advisory opinions to the UNGA or UNSC when either of those bodies so 
requests (UNC Article 96). While not legally binding, such an opinion is the 
most authoritative view of what international custom or treaties require. The 
General Assembly requested such an Advisory Opinion in 1996 regarding 
the legality of nuclear weapons.
The World Court Advisory Opinion
In its Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996 (“Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons”), the ICJ responded to the UNGA’s question: “Is 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
international law?” The opinion did respond generally to the UNGA’s 
inquiry, but left uncertain legal issues pertaining to particular circumstances. 
The international legality of Israel’s nuclear posture appears to lie within 
the ICJ opinion’s zone of uncertainty.
The opinion reached the following conclusions:
First, no treaty of universal application either authorizes or absolutely 
outlaws the use of nuclear weapons. The Court here is cognizant of the 
legally obvious — that only parties to a treaty are bound by it. However, 
since virtually all states have ratified the UNC, any use of nuclear weapons 
must overcome the very high hurdle of Article 2 Paragraph 4, which 
prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state....” The Court implies that no justification could 
clear that hurdle except, perhaps, “self-defense” under UNC Article 51.
Second, no international law custom absolutely outlaws the use, 
much less the possession of nuclear weapons. The “possession” part of 
that conclusion is a no-brainer: Since custom can only be inferred from 
uniform state practice, and since state practice reveals most of the world’s 
major powers and its most populous nations possessing nuclear weapons, 
no custom can exist that prohibits that possession. The Court recognized
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that the possession of nuclear weapons did not necessarily imply the intent 
to use them offensively. Indeed, it took note of the decades of deterrence 
that characterized the Cold War and implicitly accepted that deterrence 
might be a justification for the possession of such weapons. The use of 
nuclear weapons is another matter. While the ICJ does not find an absolute 
customary prohibition on their use, it comes pretty close. The Court 
recognizes that international custom has long held (at least since the St. 
Petersburg Declaration of 1868) that a state’s discretion in resorting to 
weaponry to harm the enemy is not unlimited. Its opinion reflects at least 
four long-standing principles of the laws of war — unnecessary suffering, 
discrimination, necessity and proportionality.
The ICJ reaffirms in its Nuclear Weapons opinion that a weapon may not 
inflict unnecessary suffering on human targets. Only that force necessary to 
stop an enemy, not to make him suffer beyond incapacitation, is permitted.
The ICJ reaffirms that a weapon must reasonably discriminate between 
combatants and non-combatants. Civilians, incapacitated wounded, surrendered 
soldiers and non-arms-bearing medics are in the latter category.
The ICJ reaffirms that force used may not be disproportionate to the 
justification for that force. Thus, customary law would prohibit destruction 
of an enemy’s entire military capacity in an otherwise justifiable armed 
response against a small border incursion.
The World Court (International Court o f Justice/ICJ) delivered its 1996Advisory 
Opinion on the use o f nuclear weapons without mentioning Israel.
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On each of these customary grounds — unnecessary suffering, 
discrimination, necessity, and proportionality — the ICJ finds the use of 
nuclear weapons generally illegal, but not necessarily in every conceivable 
case. The vagueness of the Court’s language probably reflects division and 
ambivalence within the tribunal. It suggests that there might be a situation 
where a state’s existence was threatened that justified the defensive use 
of nuclear weapons. The Court fails to elaborate on this exceptional 
hypothetical situation.
Finally, the ICJ does find an obligation to negotiate “in good faith” 
toward nuclear disarmament. Israel could arguably be breaching this duty, 
but its requirements are vague. Would Israel’s asserted willingness to agree 
to such disarmament in a phased application after a comprehensive Mideast 
Peace Settlement meet its obligation? That seems debatable.
The application of the Court’s analysis to Israel’s legal posture 
regarding nuclear weapons does not seem too difficult. Israel does not 
appear presently to be violating any rule articulated by the Court. The mere 
possession of nuclear weapons is not found to be illegal. No use of nuclear 
weapons has occurred, so no violation exists there. The Court’s “existential” 
exception to the general prohibition on use tends to support Israel’s implied 
position that it would not engage in the first use of such weapons unless its 
existence was threatened. Responding to the rather abstract question posed 
by the UNGA, the Court had no occasion to address the circumstances 
surrounding particular states’ possession of nuclear weapons, not Israel’s or 
India’s or North Korea’s or anyone else’s. The Advisory Opinion contained 
no “advice” regarding the legality of Israel’s policy of intentional ambiguity 
— its practice of not officially affirming or denying its nuclear capability.
Generally speaking, international law permits that which it does not 
prohibit. If there’s no law against it, it’s okay (legally, if not morally). The 
Court recognized this principle in the Lotus Case. Such a principle flows 
from the notion o f sovereignty: Except as explicitly limited by international 
law or by its own agreement, every state is free and independent to carry 
on its business as it sees fit. Since there is no treaty or custom that would 
require Israel or any other state to reveal whether it possesses nuclear 
weapons, there is no law that it is violating in that regard.
Perhaps an argument could be formulated that purposeful ambiguity 
regarding a state’s own possession of nuclear weapons so intimidates 
its potential enemies that such ambiguity amounts to a threat of force 
in violation of Article 2 of the UNC. However, no authoritative source 
establishes this proposition. Furthermore, the logic of such an argument 
weakens when considering that overt possession of nuclear weapons is legal.
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Certainly, if covert possession constituted an illegal “threat” under UNC 
Article 2, so would overt possession, which the ICJ does not find illegal. 
The Court recognizes the possession-equals-threat argument in its opinion, 
but does not accept it as law.
A number of the briefs submitted to the Court claimed that nuclear 
weapons were illegal by virtue of international human rights and 
environmental treaties and customs. The Court responded to these arguments 
by noting that in dealing with the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the 
controlling specific international rules were to be found under the laws of 
war. While environmental and human rights law might inform some of that 
analysis, ultimately the law of war, as discussed above, had to control.
General Assembly Resolutions and Israel
The General Assembly has passed numerous resolutions regarding 
nuclear weapons, including declarations of the weapons’ illegality and 
of Israel’s need to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As noted 
above, UNGA resolutions are not law. However, they may be evidence of 
international customary law, if they demonstrate the presence of uniform 
international practice and of opinio juris, the universal recognition by 
states of an obligatory norm. Regarding the illegality of nuclear weapons, 
the practice of important states in possessing such weapons renders any 
UNGA resolutions insufficient evidence of custom. Regarding Israel’s non­
adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the pertinent resolutions stand 
as moral and political exhortations — but no principle of international law 
requires any state to become party to any treaty. In fact, the principle of 
sovereignty supports the right of a state not to so adhere. Furthermore, unlike 
the UNSC regarding threats to peace, the UNGA lacks any power to make 
binding orders against Israel, any other state or any person whatsoever.
Can the Security Council Have Impact?
The last point raises an interesting possibility. Could the UNSC legally 
order Israel to reveal the nature of its nuclear capability, or even order it 
to disann? While politically unlikely, the theoretical answer is: “Possibly, 
yes.” The UNC empowers the Security Council to take actions it deems 
appropriate to address threats to international peace and security (UNC 
Article 39). If the UNSC found that Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity or 
its possession of nuclear weapons posed such a threat to peace, that body 
has the legal competence to order remedial action. It further has the power to 
impose sanctions if its orders are not followed (UNC Articles 41 and 42).
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Mutual Existential Fright
The Court’s Nuclear Weapons opinion implicitly raises the specter 
of mutual existential fright, since it cites as its only example of a possibly 
permissible use of atomic weapons a response to a threat to a state’s 
existence. While the ICJ does not mention Israel in its opinion, the 
applicability is obvious. Israeli officials, while not confirming possession 
of nuclear weapons, seem to have implied that, if they exist, they would 
be used in response to an immediate existential threat. One example might 
be where the Israeli Air Force has been destroyed and enemy armies are 
threatening to overrun Israeli population centers. Another would be if 
weapons of mass destruction (e.g., chemical or biological) were being used 
against such population centers. Perhaps, such officials would now add to 
the list Iran actively arming nuclear warheads on long-range missiles. One 
or more of these threats might meet the I d ’s “existential exception.”
Israel has cause for its existential fear. History — both ancient and 
recent — need not be repeated here to establish that proposition.
However, when contemplating nuclear weapons, existential fear is 
not a one-way street. Palestinians (and to some lesser degree other Arabs 
and even Iranians) have quite rational grounds for trepidation. If Israel 
were to exercise nuclear self-defense, who would be the victims, and how 
wide would be the devastation? If Israel followed those international law 
limitations of proportionality and discrimination described above, targeting 
only military objectives with tactical weapons, perhaps the damage might 
be merely awful, but not catastrophic. But it is not irrational for Arab 
populations to fear that such nice lines might not be observed by the Israeli 
military in time of perceived existential crisis.
Palestinians also have cause for existential fear, perhaps not historically 
or geopolitically equivalent to that of Jews, but real nonetheless. Does 
international law help at all with this dilemma of mutual existential fear? 
The legal limits on the use of force (immediacy, necessity, proportionality, 
discrimination, etc.) provide some brakes on the escalation to nuclear 
devastation. This is true even where self-defense is invoked, since that 
customary doctrine has long required that the threat responded to must be 
immediate, and the response proportional and only that which is absolutely 
necessary. Nuclear warfare would rarely meet these requirements.
While law is helpful, it is not sufficient. It cannot substitute for moral and 
political reconciliation. Only when neither side can contemplate eliminating 
the other will mutual existential fear disappear. A comprehensive treaty that 
recognizes Israel and Palestine’s permanent existences and provides for 
nuclear disarmament is the only legal document that will work.
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